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Case Comment
Constitutional Law: Replevin Statute Authorizing Seizure
of Property Without Notice and Hearing Held Denial of
Due Process and Seizure of Property Under Such a Statute
Without Warrant Violates the Fourth Amendment
In two actions consolidated for hearing before a three-judge
federal court,' plaintiffs sought to enjoin law enforcement officials of New York from seizing plaintiffs' property pursuant to
a state replevin statute. The facts of each action were similar:
The plaintiffs had purchased various items of household furniture but were unable to continue to make the agreed payments
on the purchase price and interest and were unable to post a
bond to reclaim the chattels in the event that they were seized
for the defendants. Plaintiff Laprease's case was typical. After
she had purchased furniture, including a bed, box-spring and
mattress and a dinette set, she defaulted on her payments. A
welfare recipient, responsible for the care of her sick husband and
ten children, she alleged that she was unable to replace the goods
to be seized and that the pretrial seizure of these items would
constitute an irreparable injury not permissible under constitutional standards.

2

Reasoning from Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,8 Judge
Port held the statute unconstitutional as a denial of due process
under the 14th amendment insofar as it permitted pre-hearing
seizure of the subject matter of the action without notice or hearing. The court held moreover, that since the statute permitted a
law enforcement official to enter upon private property without
a warrant issued by a magistrate for the purpose of seizing goods
in the possession of the defendants in these actions, the statute
in that regard violated the 4th amendment's guarantees of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Laprease v. Ray1. The three federal judges of the Northern District of New

York, Feinberg, Foley and Port, convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281
et seq (1964).
2. Laprease also alleged that she had a meritorious defense to the

action and said that she had no intention of moving the chattels during the pendency of the action. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
3. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In that case the United States Supreme

Court found a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute unconstitutional
because it sanctioned the taking of property without due process of
law; i.e., wage garnishment prior to judgment and without notice or
prior hearing is unconstitutional. See Comment, 54 MINN. L. Rsv.
853 (1970).

1971]

CASE COMMENT

mours FurnitureCo., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).4
"Replevin is one of the most ancient and well-defined writs
known to the common law." 5 Originally replevin lay only where
chattels were unlawfully taken and detained,0 but the remedy
was gradually expanded so that it lay in any case where a defendant wrongfully detained chattels belonging to the plaintiff,
without regard to the question of the wrongfulness of the taking.7 In some jurisdictions the common law action of replevin
has been replaced with the statutory remedy of claim and delivery,s or some other statutory surrogate.)
In pertinent part, the New York statute invalidated in La4. Plaintiff's contention that the statutory requirement that one
could reclaim his goods only by posting a bond violated the equal protection clause because it discriminated against poor people was not ruled
upon by the court. The court noted that such a contention took them
into a ". . . murky and uncertain area." Id. at 724-25. Moreover, the
court noted that this area may be the subject of renewed examination
by the United States Supreme Court in the near future. Id. at 725.
See Sanks v. Georgia, 399 U.S. 922 (1970), which was restored to the
calendar for reargument. In prior cases the equal protection argument
has been rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (dissent of Harlan, J.); Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S.
1037 (1967) (dissent of Douglas, J.); Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on
Forfeited Rights, 296 F. Supp. 495 (D.Conn. 1968) (whether fee necessary
before a restoration of voting rights petition would be accepted violated
equal protection of one who could not afford the fee); Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.Conn. 1968) (whether the inability to pay
filing fees for institution of divorce proceedings gives one equal protection argument); West Haven Housing Authority v. Simmons, 5 Conn.
Cir. 282, 250 A.2d 527 (1969). See also Note, Poverty and Equal Access to the Courts: The Constitutionality of Summary Dispossess in
Georgia,20 STAN. L. Rsv. 766 (1968).
5. Three States Lumber Co. v. Blanks, 133 F. 479, 481 (6th Cir.
1904). See also J.AzMvs, LECTURES ON LE.AL HsTORy 64-70 (1913). The
general use of the remedy arose in the latter part of the 13th century as
the remedy vetitum namium was falling into desuetude. Bouvm's
LAw DICTIONARY 1051 (Baldwin's Cent. Ed. 1948).
6. Coit v. Waples, 1 Minn. 110 (1850). In such a case, only the
taking (cepit) was in issue. This replevin in the cepit resembled the
old trespass vi et armis, and concentrated only on the taking. On
the other hand, replevin in the detinet was a substitute for the old action of detinue, where the injury was only in the keeping, the taking
not having been wrongful. In the latter case only the detention (or
title) was in issue. Rong v. Dawson, 9 Wis. 246 (1859); A & A Credit
Co. v. Berquist, 230 Minn. 303, 41 N.W.2d 582 (1950).
7. Coit v. Waples, 1 Minn. 110 (1850).
8. See, e.g., M'xxN. STAT.ANN. § 565.01 et seq (1947).
9. 77 C.J.S. Replevin §§ 1-3 (1952). The New York replevin statute held unconstitutional in Laprease was claimed to be a descendant of
the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Henry I, ch. 21 (1267). See N.Y. Civ.
PRsc. LAw § 7102.01 (McKinney 1963). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 119,
§ 1 et seq (Smith-Hurd 1954); IOwA CODE ANN. § 643.1-.22 (1950); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 265.01-.13 (1957).
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prease provided as follows:' 0
The sheriff shall seize a chattel without delay when the plaintiff
delivers to him an affidavit" requisition 12 and undertaking"a
and, if an action to recover 4the chattel has not been commenced,
a summons and complaint.'
If a chattel is secured or concealed in a building or enclosure
and it is not delivered pursuant to his demand, the sheriff shall
cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and shall
take the chattel into his possession. 15
The sheriff retains custody of the chattel for three days, and
provided that the defendant has not taken the steps necessary
to reclaim the chattel, it is delivered to the plaintiff at that
time.' 6
Prior to 1969 few persons would have supposed that a provisional remedy like replevin or garnishment would be found
constitutionally inadequate. The major congressional and legislative reaction to inequities in the consumer credit industry had
been to require that lenders make full and fair disclosures to
consumers instead of attempting to protect the consumer at
some later stage in the collection process. 1 7 In Sniadach, how10.

MINN.

STAT.

ANN. § 565.01 et seq. (1947)

follows very closely

the wording of the New York statute (footnotes added).
11. The affidavit identifies the chattel to be seized and states its
value, alleges that the plaintiff is entitled to possession which the
defendant wrongfully withholds, and indicates that the action has commenced. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7102(c) (McKinney 1963).
12. The requisition is deemed to be the mandate of the court directing the sheriff to seize the chattel described. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc.
LAW § 7102(d) (McKinney 1963).
Under New York law it does not
matter whether the person in possession is the defendant in the action.
13. The undertaking is simply a bond in an amount not less than
twice the value of the chattel which guarantees the return of the chattel
by the person then in possession if an adverse judgment is rendered
against him. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7102(e) (McKinney 1963).
14. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7102 (McKinney 1963). The sheriff is not
required by statute to serve the summons and complaint upon the
defendant.
15. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7110 (McKinney 1963). An Iowa statute
provides the sheriff with similar authority in a replevin action. IOWA
CODE ANN. § 643.10 (1950).
16. N.Y. Civ. PR~c. LAW §§ 7103(a) & 7102(f) (McKinney 1963).
Defendant can also prevent the plaintiff from obtaining possession if
he excepts to the plaintiff's securities or if he secures an impounding
order from the court.
17. Note, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditors' Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REv. 426 (1970). More recent statutes,

however, have begun to take cognizance of later consumer-credit relations. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE § 5-104, prohibiting
prejudgment garnishment.
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ever, the Supreme Court began to change the focus of the law
from the inception of the debtor-creditor relationship (where
legislative intent had been to equalize the bargaining positions of
the parties by increasing the purchaser's knowledge) to the dissolution of that relationship when such termination involves the
courts and the legal process generally.
Speaking for the Court in Sniadach, Justice Douglas pointed
out the hardships that garnishment imposes on a wage earner
and the injustices made possible under a prejudgment garnishment statute of the Wisconsin type. He went on to hold that
where there was no notice or opportunity to be heard before
the garnishment seizure, the taking was so "obvious" that no
extended argument was necessary to show that the statute in
question violated "fundamental principles of due process."',,
Sniadach therefore may be read as saying two quite different
things. First, where property is of such a character that its
deprivation will bring substantial hardship,") the court will apply a more rigorous constitutional standard to the procedures
which result in deprivation.20 Sniadach may also be read for the
proposition that the Constitution requires, in all cases where
property is taken, the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard .2 1 These ideas could be characterized respectively as the
subjective approach and the objective approach. The former is
18. 395 U.S. at 340-42. Prior to Sniadach two state courts had held
that prejudgment or attachment was not violative of due process.
Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932); McInnes v. McKay,
127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
Due process means, of course, that one must be afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard before he may be deprived of life, liberty or
property. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950).
19. Of course, the hardship imposed will depend in part on the
property taken, so the relationship between the type of property and
the extent of the harm is apparent. Each is clearly different from the
procedural question. In this regard see McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d
903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970) (wage garnishment statute
held unconstitutional on basis of hardship).
20. E.g., the statement of Douglas, J., in Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337,
340 (1969): "We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system." It is not likely
that Douglas meant to hold that only wages were special property,
but some courts have taken that view. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
21. "[T]he right to be heard 'has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.'" 395 U.S. at 339-40.
See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); McConaghley v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1969)
(general order of the Department of Hospitals which permitted it to
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concerned primarily with the type of property involved and the
effect of its deprivation as a major determinant of due process
while the latter is concerned solely with the procedures followed.
In Laprease, the court emphasized that since the statute permitted a pre-hearing seizure "possibly" without notice to the defendant, it violated due process and could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 22 The court was not content to stand on the
objective constitutional argument alone, however, but continued
to point out that:
Beds, stoves, mattresses . . . and other necessaries for ordinary
day-to-day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a "specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system," the taking of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party "may impose tremendous hardships" on purchasers
of these essentials.
Lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds create
hardships, it would seem, equally as severe as the temporary
of Sniadach's pay, and measured by Sniadach,
withholding of
the hardships imposed cannot be considered de minimis.23
The court was also quick to point out that contrary to defendant's suggestion, 24 the statute is not immune from attack because
25
of its age since the "blessing of age" may wear out.
It is unclear from Laprease whether the court was concerned
with the procedure involved, the type of property (or harm),
or both. At a minimum it does reject the idea that only wages
are a "specialized type of property." Whatever is the precise
ratio decidendi of Laprease and other recent post-Sniadach decisions, it is clear that concepts of due process are rapidly expanding.
Other courts which have found it necessary to construe the
decision in Sniadach have been unable to agree on the scope of
its mandate. Some courts look merely at the procedure involved
vis-a-vis notice and hearing, while others concentrate on the
determine if a patient is pecunious, how much she must pay and the
pay itself, all without notice and hearing, is void).
22. 315 F. Supp. at 722.
23. 315 F. Supp. at 722-23. Judge Port, like Douglas, J., in Sniadach, cites several sources for the proposition that garnishment and
attachments in replevin are unjust. Id. at 723-24 nn. 11 & 12.
24. 315 F. Supp. at 720-21.
25. Id. at 723. Note the statement of Douglas, J., in Sniadach, 395
U.S. 337, 340 (1969): "The fact that a procedure would pass muster
under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to
all property in its modern forms."
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type of property involved. Thus, in Arnold v. Knette,20 an
Arizona court concerned only with procedure, struck down two
writs of garnishment. Only one of the writs garnished wages,
the other garnished accounts receivable. Similarly, in deciding
whether bank accounts could be garnished without notice and
2 7
hearing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Larson v. Fetherston,
stated:
Although the majority opinion in Sniadach makes considerable
reference to the hardship of the unconstitutional procedure
upon the wage earner, we think that no valid distinction can
be made between garnishment of wages and that of other property. Clearly, a due process violation should not depend
upon
28
the type of property being subjected to the procedure.
The Wisconsin court noted the difficulty of distinguishing between wages in the hands of an employer and wages that have
29
been deposited in a bank.
The same result was reached by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc.,30 which
held that garnishment of accounts receivable without prior notice
and hearing was unconstitutional. The court noted: "No rational distinction can be drawn between a livelihood dependent
on wages and one derived from the sale of services and goods.
....,31 In spite of the fact that the Minnesota court compared
the property involved in Jones Press to that involved in Sniadach (indicating a subjective reading of Sniadach), several factors
lead to the conclusion that the Minnesota court construes Sniadach broadly or objectively. First, both parties in Jones Press
were corporations, and the garnishment was the result of business dealings and not personal or consumer dealings as in Sniadach.32 Second, in construing Sniadach, the court also noted that
26. 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969). But see Termplan, Inc.
v. The Superior Court of Maricopa County, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68
(1969), wherein the Supreme Court of Arizona refused to extend the
Sniadach doctrine beyond wages.
27. 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
28. Id. at 718, 172 N.W.2d at 23. A Hawaii court was faced with
the question of whether the Hawaii garnishment statute was constitutional but avoided the question by narrowly construing the statute.
Frank F. Fasl Supply Co. v. The Wigwam Investment Co., 308 F.
Supp. 59 (D.Hawaii 1969). See also People ex rel Lynch v. Superior
Court, 1 CaL 3d 910, 464 P.2d 126, 83 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1970).
29. Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 718, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23
(1969).
30. 286 MAinn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
31. Id. at 210, 176 N.W.2d at 90-91.
32. The Minnesota court noted that while the plaintiff was a corporation it was operated by one man, and said further: "If the wage
earner is entitled to prior notice and opportunity to be heard, no
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the garnishment of accounts receivable is in no way analogous to
the extraordinary situations cited in Sniadach as permissible situations in which due process requirements could be relaxed. 83
Finally, the issue as seen by the Minnesota court was whether
Sniadach
... applies only to the garnishment of wages, or whether it is
more broadly based on the principle that any taking without
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard is a 34denial of due
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

By asking whether Sniadach applies only to wages or to all
property, the court's decision (which in fact goes beyond wages)
necessarily implies a broad reading of Sniadach.
A recent federal court decision in California has carried the
doctrine of Sniadach even further. In Klim v. Jones,35 the court
held that a state innkeeper's lien law which permitted the taking
of a roomer's property without notice and hearing was unconstitutional.
reason occurs to us why the corner grocer, the self-employed mechanic,
or the neighborhood shopkeeper should have his income frozen ...."
176 N.W.2d at 90. Although the court failed to include corporations
or partnerships specifically in this list, the fact that the plaintiff
was a corporation and that some $165,000 of the plaintiff's money
was tied up cannot be ignored. Although accounts receivable owed to a
corporation are like wages owed to an individual, once the Sniadach
doctrine is applied to a corporation without a showing of hardship to
the owner, Sniadach should perhaps be applied to all business forms.
If a line were to be drawn, Jones Press provided the opportunity. It
involved a business, not consumer background, and there was no showing of individual hardship.
33. The special situations where due process can be relaxed according to cases cited by Sniadach include the attachment of a non-

resident's property-Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); execution
of property of bank stockholders-Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennet, 277 U.S.
29 (1928); seizure of mislabeled goods by the government-Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), and the appointment
of a conservator to manage a savings and loan association-Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
34. Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205,
207, 176 N.W.2d 87, 89 (1970) (emphasis added).
35. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The court, while stressing the right to be heard as the main ingredient of due process, noted
that this lien law enabled an innkeeper to deprive one of all his property, and not simply his wages. Under the facts of the case, this included the tools of the man's trade, his driver's license and all other
articles one might find in a single man's room. Moreover, the court
noted that innkeepers have a simple remedy whereby they may protect
themselves-advance collection. An interesting aspect of the case is
that the court premised jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) holding innkeepers' actions to be under color of
state law. It is clear from this decision that all distraint or distress
statutes, with few relevant exemption provisions, are constitutionally
suspect.
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On the other hand, some courts have held that the type of
property involved is crucial. In Michael's Jewelers v. Handy,3 0
a Connecticut court refused to find a prejudgment, foreign attachment 37 of a debtor's bank account unconstitutional.
It
held, contrary to the Wisconsin court in Fetherston, that "[the
garnishment of one's bank account... is not the attachment of
wages."3 8 Moreover, in Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 30 the
Tenth Circuit refused to find that the pre-hearing seizure of
bowling equipment under a replevin statute violated due process. The court distinguished Sniadach as involving a "specialized
type of property ... ". , 4o Judge Port had little difficulty distinguishing Brunswick because the debtor in that case had consented to the creditor's seizure of the goods without notice or
demand, and had admitted in the replevin action that he was in
default on the contract. In order to prevent creditors from simply putting a waiver into all their installment sales contracts,
enabling them to take the goods without notice or hearing on
default, Judge Port included this caveat in distinguishing Brunswick: "[W]e question that the fine print in the usual consumers conditional sales contract gives rise to a competent
4
or itelligent waiver of a constitutional right." '
36. 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969).
37. Foreign attachment here simply meant garnishment and did
not mean that the defendant was a nonresident.
38. Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 105, 266 A.2d
904, 906 (1969).
39. 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). The major issue in this case was
whether the sale of replevied goods pursuant to Oklahoma's version
of Article IX of the UNuoFmV CoUnnCAL CoDE constituted a conversion
custodia legis. Two other replevin statutes have recently been attacked as unconstitutional. In one, the procedure was found unconstitutional without citation to Sniadach. Blair v. Pitches, - Cal. Rptr.
2d - (Super. Ct. Los. Ang. County, No. 942,966 1970). In the other case
the replevin statute was sustained, the court distinguishing Sniadach
on the basis that the repossession of a gas stove and a stereo did not
create a hardship like the garnishment of wages. Fuentes v. Faircloth,
317 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
The Brunswick court, like the Supreme Court of the United
States in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) seems to be more interested in the type of property involved. In Goldberg, while finding
that welfare benefits could not be terminated without a prior notice and
hearing, the Supreme Court said: "The extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to
which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'. ... " Id. at
262-63.
40. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir.
1970).
41. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 716, 724
(N.D. N.Y. 1970). Although the court did not mention unconscionability there is a question whether the insertion of a "fine print" waiver
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A District of Columbia statute which permitted the foreclosure of a mortgage without a hearing was recently sustained
against objections that such a procedure violated due process under Sniadach.42 The court placed great emphasis on the fact
that foreclosure was possible only if that power was included in
the mortgage. Similarly, a court in Balthazar v. Mari Ltd.,' 3
held that Sniadach was not applicable to an Illinois real property tax deed statute.
There is equally little agreement among the courts when
attachment is made in order to give constructive notice to nonresidents that a suit for damages is pending against them. In
Robinson v. Loyola Foundation,Inc.,44 a Florida court refused to
find a Florida statute which permitted the ex parte attachment
of a nonresident's real property unconstitutional. It is clear
from the opinion that the court did not consider the real property attached in the action to be analogous to the wages in Sniadach. Finding no hardship akin to the deprivation of wages, the
court simply made a subjective decision that Sniadach was inapplicable. 45 The court wholly failed to consider the Supreme
would be unconscionable under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302,

even though the Code provides for the contractural modification of
remedies in § 2-719. A finding of unconscionability is a possibility.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 261 (1970) notes that in the face of "brutal need," it would be
"unconscionable" to deprive a person of property (in that case, welfare
payments) without "overwhelming" governmental interests. If that
is so, it might be unconscionable not only for a businessman to put a
waiver into a contract, permitting the businessman to repossess without
notice and hearing, but it might also be unconscionable to use selfhelp in any case where self-help would impose "brutal need" upon the
debtor.
Such a hardship argument, of course, may or may not have a bearing
on the purely procedural question of whether the government, which
cannot permit the replevy of goods by a sheriff without notice and
hearing, can permit a creditor under § 9-503 of the UNIFORM COMJudge Port
MERCIAL CODE to use self-help in respossessing property.
gives no indication in his opinion whether self-help under the UCC is
constitutionally permissible.
42. Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970). For a
pre-Sniadach state court decision sustaining such a statute see Roos v.
Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 321 P.2d 210 (1958).
43. 301 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1969). It is interesting to note that
in both this case and in Young, the courts realized that the result they
sustained could have harsh consequences.
44. - Fla. Supp. _, 236 So. 2d 154 (1970).
45. Some writers have taken the view that Sniadach should not
apply to the prejudgment attachment of realty because such a lien
merely restricts alienability. See, e.g., Note, Attachment and Garnishment-Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law, 68 Mici. L. REV. 986,
1000 (1970). On the other hand, the use of foreign attachment pro-
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Court's apparent "blessing" of the propriety of a pre-notice and
hearing attachment of a nonresident's property. In Sniadach,
Justice Douglas distinguished acquisition of quasi in rem jurisdiction through attachment of property of a nonresident saying
that a "... procedural rule that may satisfy due process for
attachments in general, see McKay v. McKinnes ... does not
necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case." 40 As
was noted in Laprease, McInnes was affirmed per curiam, the
Court citing two prior cases. 47 One of the prior cases cited involved the attachment of the property of a nonresident debtor.48
The other case cited in the McInnes affirmance involved the special governmental interest in protecting the public during a time
'of bank failures. 49 Implicit in Sniadach, therefore, is the
premise that the requirements of due process are not the same
where there is a nonresident debtor or where there is an overriding interest to be protected. 50
I am
Justice Harlan, concurring in Sniadach, said, "...
quite unwilling to take the unexplicated per curiam in McKay v.
McInnes... as vitiating or diluting these essential elements of
due process." 51 When the classic case arose involving the garnishment of a nonresident's wages the Delaware court, in Mills
v. Bartlett,5 2 had no difficulty striking down the statute:
Since the Sniadach case clearly holds that it is the garnishment
of wages without notice and prior hearing which offends due
process principles, the fact that the instant case concerns a foreign rather than a domestic attachment or garnishment is irrelecedures has been severely criticized. Id. at 1003-04; Carrington, The
Moderm Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,76 HAZv. L. REv. 303 (1962).
46. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
47. McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
48. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). See note 33 supra and
accompanying text.
49. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
50. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. See also the
statement in Goldberg v. Kelly, 297 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970): ' The extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded the [welfare] recipient
[before her benefits are terminated] ... depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." This kind of statement indicates an
intent that due process varies with hardship and competing interests.
If that is so, the type of property involved in a summary proceeding
will probably be of greater probative influence than the kind of procedure. In other words, the hardship of the deprivation will be
weighed against some other social or individual interest and the resolution of that balancing will determine the type of procedure constitutionally required.
51. 395 U.S. at 343-44.
52. -_ Del. _, 265 A.2d 39 (1970).
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vant and immaterial
since it is the defendant's wages which
have been frozen. 53
The factors that will determine the outcome of any particular case have been summarized by one writer as follows:
(T)here seem to be no cogent reasons for limiting the scope of
the Sniadach rationale to the wage garnishment context so
long as the following suggested factors are present: (1) a prejudgment seizure without notice or an opportunity to be heard;
(2) a "strong" (i.e., corporate or institutional) creditor versus a
"weak" consumer-debtor; (3) an absence of "special" creditor interests (i.e., where the debtor is a resident of the state, is not
avoiding process and is not threatening to dispose of the property in fraud of his creditors); (4) an absence of special state
interests (i.e., where the property involved is not dangerous to
health and does not otherwise affect the public interest); and
(5) a type of property intrinsically valuable to the debtor but
only extrinsically valuable to the creditor (e.g., where the nature of the property is relevant to the creditor only to the extent
that it is convertible into money or its equivalent, 4but where
the debtor does find its inherent qualities important).5
The finding by the Laprease court that New York's replevin
statute violated the plaintiff's rights to notice and hearing before
their property could be taken was compelled, both objectively
and subjectively, by the decision in Sniadach. The taking of
wages from a wage earner is not distinguishable from the taking
of his essential home furnishings, and the lack of notice and hearing in Laprease is obvious. Laprease leaves unanswered the
principle question following the Sniadach ruling, which is
whether Sniadach is to be read narrowly, as concerned only
with certain types of property, or whether the decision is to be
read broadly, as laying out a procedural rule to be followed in
all but exceptional cases. At the least, Laprease expands Sniadach in two ways. First, it indicates clearly that wages are not
the only type of property the courts will protect under Sniadach; second, it indicates that garnishment is not the only procedure that will be struck down. Therefore, not only will such
traditional remedies as replevin, attachment and self-help come
under further examination by the courts, but cognovit notes,
mortgage foreclosure by advertisement and various foreclosures
of statutory liens will surely be the subject of renewed litigation.55
Whatever the eventual scope of Sniadach, two important
problems will remain: the scope of the hearing required and
53. Id. at -, 265 A.2d at 41.
54. Note, supra note 17, at 431.
55. Also suspect would be arrest, receivership and temporary injunctions. See Note, supra note 17, at 434-50; Fleming, Garnishment
and the Supreme Court, 74 COM. L.J. 264, 265 (1969).
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the effect of contractual waiver. The only clue Judge Port gives
as to the nature of the hearing required is the statement that he
does not mean to suggest that ". . . nothing less than a full adversary evidentiary hearing prior to seizure.. ."5Q is necessary.
Instead, he suggests that the ex parte order of a judge might be
sufficient. In his concurring opinion in Sniadach, Justice Harlan
was more specific. He said:
•. . I think that due process is afforded only by the kinds of
"notice" and "hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim
against the debtor before he can be deprived of his property
or its unrestricted use.57
The recent Supreme Court case of Goldberg v. Kelly58 described
the type of hearing required before one's welfare benefits could
be terminated as not necessarily of the judicial or quasi-judicial
type, but that the defendant should be able to confront witnesses that are adverse to him, present witnesses of his own and
present evidence before a decision maker. The defendant is
permitted to have counsel, but the decision maker is not required to file a full opinion or make findings of fact and conclusions of law. He may simply list the reasons for his decision.
A procedure of this formality clearly will be time-consuming
and costly to creditors.
The second problem the courts will eventually have to face
is the effect of a contractural waiver of the right to prior notice and hearing. As was noted earlier,5 9 Laprease indicated that
a waiver might be invalid. On the other hand, the court in
Young v. Ridley, 60 said:
...
the practical effect of Sniadach will probably be minimal,
since creditors will henceforth probably require debtors to
execute promissory notes containing wage assignments contingent upon default in repayment. 61
In addition to its due process infirmities, the New York statutory provision,6 2- which permitted the sheriff to break open a
building if necessary to take possession of a chattel without a
56. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 315 F. Supp. 716,
725 (N.D. N.Y. 1970).
57. 337 U.S. at 343. Justice Harlan cites, inter alia, Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
58. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
59. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
60. 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970). The court noted that the contractual power to foreclose a mortgage was similar to a confession of
judgment clause in a contract.
61. Id. at 1312.
62. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7110 (McKinney 1963).
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warrant and without the intervention of a judicial officer, was
held by the court in Laprease to violate the fourth amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Judge
Port, citing James v. Goldberg,6 3 held that a search of a private
dwelling without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. The
court was unimpressed with defendant's argument that the
fourth amendment applies only to criminal and not civil proceedings. The court said:
The argument that the Fourth Amendment does not apply, is
supported by neither good sense nor law. If the sheriff cannot

invade the privacy of a home without a warrant when the state
interest is to prevent crime, he should not be able to do so to
retrieve a stove or refrigerator about which the right to possession is disputed. Nor should he have any greater right to
make a seizure of these or similar chattels not within a building
or enclosure by virtue of a requisition "deemed to be the
mandate of the court .. .

The finding that the fourth amendment does not exist as a
shield merely to prevent intrusions in criminal matters is supported both by developing case law 5 and by reason. See, for
example, statement of Prettyman, J., in District of Columbia v.
Little: 6

[T]he common-law right of a man to privacy in his home
*

.

. is one of the . . . essentials of our concept of civilization.

It was firmly established in the common law as one of the
brightest features of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to human
progress. It was not related to crime or suspicion of crime....
To say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection
against (the) search of his home without a warrant, but that a
man not suspected of crime has not such protection, is a fantastic absurdity.67
63.

303 F. Supp. 935, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) prob. juris. noted sub.

nom. Wyman v. James, 397 U.S. 904 (1970). In that case the court held
that a New York welfare department could not deny, reduce or terminate Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to an individual
who refused to allow a case worker entry into her home without a
warrant issued upon probable cause under the fourth amendment.
64. 315 F. Supp. at 722. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) (city must secure a warrant before it can search an
apartment building for housing code violations if the owner denies
entry); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (city must have a
warrant to inspect commercial buildings for code violations). It should
be noted that in both Camara and See a criminal penalty lay behind an
uncorrected housing code violation. Similarly, one who hindered a
sheriff in his efforts to replevy goods was subject to punishment. The
court noted this fact as supporting the proposition that this was not exclusively a civil matter where the fourth amendment might not apply.
65. See id.
66. 85 App. D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13 (1949), aff'd. on other grounds,
339 U.S. 1 (1950).
67. Id. at 246, 178 F.2d at 16-17.
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One can have little dispute with the judicial enlargement of
the protection of the fourth amendment to civil actions. 68 Similarly, the extension of the Sniadach rationale to household furnishings in Laprease is equally desirable. Although it has been
suggested that Sniadach be limited to property "important to
daily life,"69 such an approach seems to misplace priorities. The
better rule would seem to be to expand Sniadach to include all
property. The latter approach recognizes that due process of
law, as a concept, is concerned with procedure and emphasizes
the point that legal analysis of any case should better begin
with the feeling that the absence of procedural due process is
unacceptable rather than acceptable. There is, after all, a definite interest in maximizing liberty and minimizing restraint.
Only after these ground rules are adopted should the courts begin their delicate process of balancing competing goals by weighing the hardship involved in the particular case and the identity
of the parties with such interests as promoting the extension of
credit, collection of claims and unclogged court calendars.

68. This type of decision may eventually lead to the legal doctrine requiring counsel for a defendant in a civil action as well as a
criminal action. See, e.g., In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72
Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968).
69. Note, supra note 45, at 1002.

